
In theory, it exists to protect borrowers. In practice, it’s often reduced to a checkbox that excludes financially capable people based on proxies that no longer reflect how income actually works.
To understand why this matters, and why Doorly approaches Ability to Repay differently, it helps to start with what the rule was meant to do—and how it drifted.
Ability to Repay (ATR) was introduced to answer a simple question:
It was designed to prevent the kinds of loans that dominated the pre-2008 era—products where approval was based on speculative assumptions rather than real financial capacity.
At its core, ATR is supposed to evaluate:
Notice what’s not on that list: a single credit score, a specific employment type, or a rigid documentation format.
Over time, ATR stopped being treated as a principle and started being treated as a rulebook. Instead of asking, “Can this person afford this home?”, the system began asking:
These questions are easier to automate and easier to sell into the secondary market—but they are not the same as evaluating real repayment ability. As a result, Ability to Repay often gets conflated with Ability to Document Income in a Very Specific Way.
That distinction matters.
Credit scores were never designed to measure affordability. They measure past credit behavior—not current earning power, cash flow, or sustainability.
Yet over time, scores became a convenient stand-in for deeper analysis:
This approach creates two failures at once:
Neither outcome serves borrowers—or the system.
The modern economy produces income that is real, recurring, and sustainable—but not always linear.
Many financially responsible buyers:
Under traditional underwriting, variability is treated as risk—even when the long-term picture is stable and strong.
That’s not an Ability to Repay problem. That’s a model design problem.
A true Ability to Repay assessment looks beyond surface-level signals and focuses on fundamentals:
In other words: context, not checklists.
This kind of evaluation requires judgment, flexibility, and structure that can absorb nuance—things traditional mortgage pipelines are not optimized to do.
The reason isn’t a lack of understanding. It’s economics.
Traditional lenders underwrite primarily for the secondary market. That market rewards:
Nuance is expensive. Judgment is hard to scale. Variability doesn’t securitize well.
So instead of evolving underwriting to match modern income, the industry optimized around what was easiest to sell—not what best reflected reality.
Doorly was built around a different question:
That means:
This isn’t looser lending. It’s more honest lending.
By separating ownership from the rigid constraints of traditional mortgage pipelines, Doorly can apply Ability to Repay as it was intended: as a meaningful assessment of affordability, not a proxy for conformity.
When Ability to Repay is misused, capable buyers stay renters longer than they should. Wealth doesn’t build. Stability gets delayed.
When it’s applied correctly, lending becomes safer—not riskier—because decisions are based on reality instead of assumptions.
The future of homeownership depends on closing the gap between how people earn and how systems evaluate them.
Ability to Repay was always meant to bridge that gap. It just needs to be used the way it was intended.